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Research summary: This study examines the effectiveness of targets as a tool for the 
contractual governance of cross-sector partnerships. Applying a difference-in-differences 
methodology, we find that the use of explicit targets within performance contracts is an 
effective means for improving partnership outcomes, especially where partner diversity 
and partnership capabilities are high. Furthermore, we find evidence that target intensity 
is associated with stronger partnership performance. These findings suggest that 
contractual forms with explicit targets may be a particularly successful approach for 
enhancing the public value created by cross-sector partnerships. A downward turn in 
performance following the removal of targets lends further support to this conclusion. 
 
Managerial summary: Cross-sector partnerships have become a vital means for creating 
value in pursuit of the public interest. In particular, the effective management of these 
partnerships is regarded as holding the key to addressing the strategic and organizational 
challenges posed by major social and environmental issues, such as big data and climate 
change. In this article, we combine data on waste recycling from 2003-2014 with 
information on performance contracts between local cross-sector partnerships and higher 
levels of government in England to quantify the impact of governance by targets on the 
performance of those partnerships. The benefits of target-setting for partnership 
performance that we identify are even stronger when partner diversity is high and 
partnership capabilities are strong. We discuss the managerial and policy implications of 
our findings. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Strategic management scholars increasingly recognise that collaboration between 
business, government and civil society is vital for creating value and achieving important 
social goals (George et al., 2016; Koschmann et al., 2012). Defined as ‘multi-actor 
collaborative arrangements’ to achieve a common objective (Quélin et al., 2017; Selsky 
and Parker, 2005), cross-sector partnerships (CSPs) promise enhanced value creation 
because when organizations from different sectors work together they create new 
collaborative capabilities (Kivleniece and Quélin, 2012; Mahoney et al., 2009). Despite 
growing interest in the governance of these ‘hybrid’ inter-organizational forms (Quélin 
et al., 2017), surprisingly little research investigates the specific contractual forms and 
partnership capabilities likely to make them a success.  
To date, scholarship dealing with the performance of CSPs has largely sought to 
identify capabilities that compensate for incomplete contracts (Cabral, 2017; Cabral et 
al., 2013). This research casts valuable light on collaborative strategic management, but 
focuses on public-private interactions and is less applicable to the multi-actor CSPs 
unable to rely on equity-based structures for value appropriation (Gulati et al., 2012). 
CSPs often entail ‘relationships much broader than its legal definition’ (Hamlin and 
Lyons 1996, p.3). For this reason, the creation of value by CSPs may benefit most from 
contractual forms of governance that utilise tools for inducing positive behaviour change, 
such as performance goals and targets (de Man and Roijakkers, 2009). Drawing on 
transaction costs and capabilities theories, we analyze the efficacy of contractual forms 
with explicit targets for the governance of CSPs, along with the partnership capabilities 
that shape the effectiveness of ‘governance by targets’. Our main contribution is to 
identify the key role that partner diversity and partnership capabilities play in ensuring 
contractual governance enhances the value created by CSPs. 
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Transaction cost theory suggests clear and transparent objectives hold the key to 
achieving goal commitment in inter-organizational relationships (Williamson, 1979). 
Performance targets may therefore be especially applicable to the governance of CSPs 
because they lessen the costs of co-ordinating complex systems (de Man and Roijakkers, 
2009; Grant, 2003). Moreover, partner diversity may enhance the benefits of target-
setting for value creation by CSPs, because it nurtures the collaborative capabilities 
required to achieve partnership goals (Quélin et al., 2017). Likewise, partnership 
capabilities may strengthen positive target effects, as the costs of synchronising collective 
effort will be lower in CSPs with more administrative capacity and experience of 
partnership-working (Cabral, 2017). Target intensity too may make partners more 
motivated to achieve shared goals. 
To understand whether targets are effective tools for the contractual governance 
of CSPs, we analyse their relationship with the performance of Local Strategic 
Partnerships (LSPs) across England between 2003 and 2014. These partnerships brought 
together representatives of the peak public, private and non-profit sector organizations1 
within each local area of the country to develop a co-ordinated cross-sector approach to 
the creation of social and environmental value, particularly through the delivery of key 
public services, such as education, social care and waste management. In 2008, LSPs 
                                                            
1 All of the LSP executive boards included representatives from the local government responsible for the 
jurisdictions in which the LSP operated, with most being chaired by the chief executive or the political 
leader of that government. Other sub-national public sector organizations represented on the LSP boards 
included police forces, fire brigades, local hospitals and universities. In addition, some boards included 
local representatives of national level agencies, such as the Environment Agency, and regional level 
agencies, such as the Government Offices of the Regions. From the private sector, the majority of the LSP 
executive boards included representatives from the local Chambers of Commerce, with some including 
representatives from large employers, such as Rolls Royce in Derby and BT in South Tyneside. Groundwork 
contractors, were also represented on some boards. Nonprofit representatives on the executive boards 
largely came from the local Community and Volunteer Services (CVS) and the Council of Voluntary 
Organisations (CVO), but housing associations were often represented on the boards. Although 
constrained to include certain key public sector partners (e.g. local governments and police forces), the 
structure of LSPs is an endogenous product of the diverse economic and political histories of local areas 
of England. A fuller list of the organizations on LSP boards is available on request. 
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negotiated Local Area Agreements (LAAs) with the UK government specifying targets 
for selected key performance indicators and offering reward payments for target 
attainment. The indicators targeted in LAAs varied depending on the priorities agreed by 
LSP boards, with some LAAs focused on environmental performance and others on 
public health or social welfare. This variation in the content of the performance contracts 
enables us to examine whether ‘governance by targets’ is an effective strategy for 
enhancing value creation by CSPs. Moreover, we can shed light on the partnership 
capabilities likely to enhance the use of targets by exploiting heterogeneity in the 
composition of the LSP boards, the age, administrative capacity and management of each 
LSP and the target intensity within LAAs.  
To analyse the potential for governance by targets to enhance value creation by 
CSPs, we use a difference-in-differences-style approach. Such approaches can 
approximate causal treatment effects using observational data, providing the method 
assumptions hold (Angrist and Pischke, 2008; Antonakis et al., 2010). Here, we focus on 
LSPs’ environmental performance by analysing variations in waste recycling rates for 
those LSPs with and without a recycling target. Climate change is widely regarded as the 
paradigmatic societal challenge requiring a cross-sectoral collaborative approach (George 
et al., 2016), and so evidence on the governance arrangements associated with the 
creation of environmental value can cast valuable light on the dynamics of strategic 
management in the public interest.2 To establish whether partnership capabilities 
influence the effectiveness of governance by targets, we then examine the moderating 
effects of several key variables: the share of public, private and non-profit sector 
organizations on the board of each LSP; the age of each LSP; the volume of administrative 
                                                            
2 Of the small pool of performance indicators included within LAAs that are suitable for our longitudinal 
difference-in-differences research design, waste recycling rates were the most strongly related to the 
societal grand challenges that presently confront humanity. 
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support available to each LSP; and, the experience of the senior manager responsible for 
the performance of the LSP. Following that, we evaluate whether the relative intensity of 
the recycling target matters. 
Our analysis suggests that the use of contractual forms with explicit targets results 
in performance improvement – an effect especially pronounced for CSPs with high 
partner diversity and strong partnership capabilities. We also find that CSPs with more 
challenging performance targets perform better than those with less demanding ones. 
Further analysis reveals a downward trend in performance when the targets were 
removed. These results all provide support for the target-based governance of CSPs.  
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Transaction costs theories highlight that contractual governance structures are required to 
mitigate opportunistic behaviour whenever organizations work closely together (Oxley, 
1997; Williamson, 1979). Contractual-based governance arrangements centre on the 
development of formal legal agreements that specify the rights and obligations of the 
various organizations involved in a collaboration (Argyres and Mayer, 2007; Wuyts and 
Geyskens, 2005). The primary advantage of contractual-based governance is that it 
reduces the transaction costs associated with co-ordinating and managing the diverse 
activities undertaken by different partners (Faems et al., 2008). Explicit contracts provide 
assurance that opportunistic behaviour and shirking are minimised, as the terms on which 
partners agree to work together are legally enforceable (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992). For 
this reason, contract completeness is regarded as critical to effective contractual-based 
governance (Cheung, 1969; Williamson, 1991).      
 The challenges associated with making inter-organizational collaborations a 
success may be especially acute for CSPs, due to the distinctive value creation logics that 
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characterise different sectors (Vurro et al., 2010; Le Ber and Branzei, 2010). In particular, 
whereas partnerships between private firms can usually rely on equity-based value 
appropriation to align partners’ interests (Hennart, 1988), this option is rarely open to 
public or nonprofit organizations, because of the accountability mechanisms to which 
they are subject (Bryson et al., 2006). Moreover, CSPs vary considerably in authority, 
‘incentives, property rights, coordination mechanisms, and agency relationships’ (Quélin 
et al., 2017, p.767). CSPs may even be ‘meta-organizations’ consisting of multiple legally 
autonomous actors that share a common system-wide goal (Gulati et al., 2012). As a 
result, CSPs often rely on nonequity governance mechanisms to minimize partner 
opportunism (Rufin and Rivera-Santos, 2012).  
Among the alternative nonequity-based governance structures available to CSPs, 
contracts stipulating partners’ roles and responsibilities are likely to be attractive (Wang 
and Bunn, 2004). Because such contracts inevitably entail a degree of incompleteness 
(Brown et al., 2010), it may also be necessary to utilise nonequity-based financial 
“hostages” to mitigate opportunism, such as penalties for poor performance or rewards 
for exemplary performance (Daniels and Trebilcock, 1996). Nevertheless, strategic 
management research has yet to systematically address non-equity strategies for the 
governance of cross-sector collaboration, especially the use of performance targets 
intended to positively influence the decisions and behaviour of partners.  
 
Contractual governance forms with explicit targets and the 
performance of CSPs 
From a transaction cost perspective, targets may be especially attractive for the 
governance of CSPs because they can circumscribe shirking and opportunistic behaviour 
(Rufin and Rivera-Santos, 2012). The strategic alliance literature indicates that in addition 
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to reducing the transaction costs associated with securing goal alignment, explicit targets 
furnish the goal clarity required for the pursuit of shared objectives (Shenkar and Zeira, 
1992; Killing, 2012). As a reference-point for partners and a check on goal divergence, 
targets may help partnerships to resolve conflict and differences as they arise (Hoffmann 
and Schlosser, 2001; Poppo and Zenger, 2002).  
The high degree of specificity implied in the use of targets may be especially 
important for the effective governance of CSPs, as it can signal a credible commitment 
to shared objectives (Beuve et al., 2018). Public partners, in particular, may value 
governance tools that insulate cross-sectoral collaborations from the risks posed by 
political turnover and contestability (Moszoro et al., 2016). In a similar vein, private 
partners prefer mechanisms that reduce uncertainty due to public policy changes or rent-
seeking by government agencies (Mazouz et al., 2008; Spiller, 2008). Furthermore, 
target-setting can surmount the difficulties associated with measuring and monitoring 
value creation through cross-sectoral collaboration (Page et al., 2015; Selsky and Parker, 
2005). CSPs agreeing targets within contractual-based governance arrangements may 
therefore outperform those that do not for several reasons.  
Firstly, the use of a performance contract based on targets widens the range of 
tools that can be brought to bear on the strategic management of CSPs. This is especially 
important for multi-sector collaborations, because of the need to develop flexible 
structures capable of harnessing partners’ diverse but complementary capabilities (Clarke 
and Fuller, 2010; Selsky and Parker, 2005). Secondly, the strategic management 
challenge posed by partners’ sectoral differences may be best met through governance 
mechanisms, which enable higher levels of government to monitor and guide CSPs (Koch 
and Buser, 2006). Indeed, targets have become a popular policy prescription for 
institutions aiming to develop cross-sectoral and multi-level governance structures to deal 
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with complex societal challenges, such as climate change and sustainable development 
(Jordan et al., 2015; Owens, 2010; Stern, 2008). Thirdly, in addition to widening the 
portfolio of governance mechanisms available for the strategic management of CSPs, 
performance targets may be essential for preserving the purpose of CSPs, which can be 
vulnerable to changes in policy and personnel within partner organizations (Babiak and 
Thibault, 2009). We therefore propose: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Contractual governance forms with explicit targets will have a positive 
effect on the performance of CSPs 
 
The role of partner diversity in contractual governance forms with 
explicit targets  
The co-ordination challenges posed by partner differences within inter-organizational 
relationships may intensify as the number of partners grows and the salience of 
organizational ‘faultlines’ expands (Li and Hambrick, 2005). Nevertheless, such partner 
diversity may be a vital source of collaborative advantage. The behavioural theory of the 
firm suggests that heterogeneous groups foster more innovative solutions to achieve 
organizational objectives, because they are able to draw on a wider range of ideas, 
knowledge and information (Miller and Triana, 2009). Moreover, by expanding the 
breadth of human and social capital available to a collaborative enterprise, partner 
diversity may reduce the dependence of joint ventures on resources from external actors 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Because it widens the scope for mutual interdependence 
within collaborations (Ashraf et al., 2017), partner diversity may also decrease the 
transaction costs associated with achieving shared goals – something that is especially 
important for effective governance of CSPs. 
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Partner diversity within CSPs requires careful management due to the competing 
institutional logics associated with different sectors (Vurri et al., 2010), especially the 
market logic of private partners and the public good logic of public and non-profit 
partners (Ashraf et al., 2017). However, it is only by encouraging the participation of a 
wide a range of partners that CSPs can muster the array of organizational capabilities 
necessary for comprehensive action in pursuit of the public interest (Lasker et al., 2001). 
Sectoral diversity within CSPs facilitates access to vital resources and unique capabilities, 
and encourages the combination of the complementary capabilities required for blended 
value creation (Klein et al., 2010; Ashraf et al., 2017; Quélin et al., 2017). As a critical 
source of collaborative advantage, partner diversity may therefore reduce the transaction 
costs associated with orchestrating the achievement of targets that have been agreed in 
advance by the partners within a CSP. For all of the above reasons, partner diversity seems 
likely to enhance the positive effects of contractual forms with explicit targets. Hence, we 
advance: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The positive performance effects of contractual governance forms with 
explicit targets will be stronger for CSPs with higher partner diversity   
 
The role of partnership capabilities in contractual governance forms 
with explicit targets 
Researchers increasingly draw on capabilities theories to examine the dynamics of inter-
organizational relationships (Cabral, 2017). Capabilities are the high-level practices used 
to coordinate the productive activities of organizations (Winter, 2003). As such, they 
represent a distinctive set of ‘problem-solving patterns’, routines or competencies that 
can be deployed in pursuit of key goals (Feldman and Pentland, 2003). The strategic 
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alliances literature indicates that alliance experience may be a first precondition for the 
development of the relational capability required for collaborative success (Anand and 
Lhanna, 2000; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Kale et al., 2002). In addition, strategy scholars 
have pointed toward the value of a dedicated alliance function as the source of the 
administrative capabilities required for effective alliance management (Kale et al., 2002; 
Kale and Singh, 2007). Likewise, skilled and experienced managers responsible for the 
management of strategic alliances represent a vital source of relational capability (Kale 
and Singh, 2007). 
CSPs promise enhanced value creation through the creation of new collaborative 
capabilities (Cabral et al., 2013; Klein et al., 2010; Mahoney et al. 2009). Those with a 
longer history of collaboration are therefore likely to have stronger capability for 
addressing the challenges posed by sectoral differences and for harnessing the distinctive 
sectoral advantages that are present (Bryson et al., 2006; Lasker et al., 2001). 
Accumulated capabilities in managing CSPs reduce the transaction costs associated with 
achieving goal alignment and commitment, as partners do not need to build the trust and 
understanding required to underpin collective action (Quélin et al., 2016). As a result, 
established CSPs may be especially well-placed to reap the benefits of target-setting for 
partnership performance because they already have routines for bringing together 
different partners in pursuit of shared objectives (Caldwell et al., 2017).      
Within CSPs, public organizations have a distinctive advantage over their private 
and non-profit partners in terms of their capability for authoritative decision-making 
(Rufin and Rivera-Santos, 2012). As such, the administrative support and managerial 
expertise available to the lead public sector organizations within CSPs are likely to be 
key sources of collaborative capability (Cabral, 2017). For many CSPs, the administrative 
capacity present within public organizations is the main back office support that can be 
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deployed in pursuit of partnership goals. Likewise, the democratic mandate of public 
organizations means that senior public managers often bear the responsibility for the 
management and performance of CSPs (Rufin and Rivera-Santos, 2012). The transaction 
costs associated with getting commitment to shared goals therefore seem likely to be 
lower in CSPs with more administrative capacity and managerial experience. Hence, the 
use of targets within the contractual governance of CSPs may be a more effective strategy 
for creating social and environmental value where those partnerships are better able to 
draw on public sector management capabilities. Following the above arguments, we 
postulate: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The positive performance effects of contractual governance forms with 
explicit targets will be stronger for CSPs with more partnership capabilities   
 
The role of target intensity in contractual governance forms with explicit 
targets 
Strategic alliance research highlights that a key component of effective contractual-based 
governance is the agreement of performance objectives which can guide partners’ efforts 
and ensure that the goals of partners are aligned (de Man and Roijakkers, 2009; Killing, 
2012). Such agreements centre on the adoption of performance indicators that partners 
believe can effectively measure fundamental partnership goals. In addition to reducing 
the transaction costs around securing goal alignment, the formulation and articulation of 
performance standards can have positive attentional and motivational effects. Goals and 
targets are mechanisms that enable decision-makers to cope with bounded rationality 
(Ocasio, 1998) – something that is particularly acute within the management of CSPs, 
given the limited capacity for monitoring all of the activities of disparate partners 
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(Reeves, 2008). These benefits may be even stronger where targets are set that “stretch” 
organizations (Hamel and Prahalad, 1993).  
“Stretch targets” inspire organizations to search for new and innovative ways to 
improve performance (Sitkin et al., 2011; Thompson et al., 1997). Prior empirical 
research indicates that high levels of target stretch or intensity, defined as the degree of 
improvement from a given baseline required to attain a specific target, are associated with 
performance improvement (see, for example, Boyne and Chen, 2007). A greater degree 
of target intensity amplifies the attentional effects of target-setting, lowering the 
transaction costs of achieving goal alignment and commitment even further (Grant, 
2003). Hence, there is good reason to anticipate that performance clauses that incorporate 
a higher degree of target intensity may enhance the effectiveness of contractual 
governance forms with explicit targets as tools for enhancing value creation. This seems 
particularly apt for the co-ordination of CSPs, which may be more likely to create social 
and environmental value when authoritative communications are proffered that can 
galvanize partners’ efforts (Koschmann et al., 2012). Although little systematic 
scholarship has addressed the impact of target intensity on the performance of CSPs, case 
studies point towards the attentional benefits of more challenging goals for cross-sector 
collaboration (Andrews et al., 2014; Manning et al., 2006). This leads us to posit: 
 
Hypothesis 4: The positive performance effects of contractual governance forms with 
explicit targets will be stronger for CSPs with higher levels of target intensity   
 
METHODOLOGY 
Sample and data 
The sample for this study comprises 146 of the 150 Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) 
extant across England, for the period 2003 to 2014. Four LSPs are excluded as they only 
13 
 
came into being in 2009 after a local government reorganization. All LSPs negotiated and 
signed performance contracts (LAAs) with UK central government, but each of the LSPs’ 
contracts comprised a different set of statutory performance indicators that were targeted 
as local priorities by the LSP boards. In 2007, sixty-eight of our sample of LSPs 
negotiated LAAs with UK central government that included waste recycling targets for 
2010. These performance contracts came into force in 2008, with the baseline rate of 
waste recycling taken in 2007.  
Financial rewards were available for target attainment, and were calculated on the 
basis of average target achievement across all targeted indicators (Department of 
Communities and Local Government, 2009). There was no financial penalty for failure 
to achieve the agreed targets. While the environmental performance of LSPs without a 
recycling LAA was not subject to a performance contract, it was still monitored by UK 
central government, with LSPs having recycling rates in the bottom quartile for England 
potentially vulnerable to regulatory intervention (Audit Commission, 2005). The form of 
intervention this could take varied from the imposition of new interim management by 
central government to the transferring of service decision-making to another LSP. 
Although such extreme interventions did not occur within environmental services during 
the study period, the threat of such interventions was very real. For instance, the co-
ordination of social care services in some areas was transferred to neighbouring LSPs. 
We are therefore well-placed to investigate the effectiveness of contractual forms with 
explicit targets because we are able to exploit variations in the content of the LAAs signed 
between LSPs and UK central government. Detailed information on these was provided 
by the Department for Communities and Local Government, and has been used in prior 
research (Andrews et al., 2014). 
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Dependent variable 
The dependent variable in this study is the percentage of household waste re-used, 
recycled or composted in each LSP. Information on LSPs’ waste recycling rate comes 
from the UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), which 
publishes a range of environmental policy statistics. The recycling and re-use of 
household waste is a critical component of the European Union’s climate change 
mitigation strategy (European Environment Agency, 2013), and therefore a key indicator 
of the environmental value created by LSPs. UK recycling statistics are verified by 
government auditors.  
 
Independent variables 
The first independent variable (D) reflects whether a LSP signed a LAA for waste 
recycling. It is a binary indicator equal to one for LSPs with a LAA for waste recycling 
after year 2007, and zero otherwise; in mathematical notation, D=(treatment * d), where 
treatment is a dichotomous variable which equals one for the “treated” group (LSPs with 
a recycling LAA) and zero for the control group (LSPs without an LAA), and d is a time 
dummy switched on for post 2007 observations, i.e., after LAAs came into force. 
To test whether CSPs’ heterogeneity influences the effectiveness of contractual 
forms with explicit targets (H2), we include in our models a moderator variable measuring 
the degree of partner diversity. This is gauged by means of a Blau index denoting the 
relative share of organizations from the public, private and non-profit sectors on the 
executive board of each LSP. Information on board composition was drawn from the 
Sustainable Community Strategies that LSPs were required to produce in 2008 and from 
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executive board meeting minutes from the same period available online.3 To accurately 
capture sectoral differences in capability, a coding frame was developed to assign board 
representatives to a particular sector of the economy (available on request). The frame 
was guided by the assumption that ownership status provides the best approximation of 
sectoral origin, but we also followed Bozeman (1987) in recognising that some 
organizations (e.g. UK universities, which are registered charities) are public because 
they are financially dependent upon and controlled by government.4  
To investigate the role of capabilities as performance-enablers of contractual 
forms with explicit targets (H3), three different measures are used as moderator 
covariates. First, the variable, lsp age, gauges the years that have passed since either the 
present LSP itself was set up or a predecessor area-wide CSP was in place. This variable 
capturing accumulated partnership capabilities, is akin to those used in the strategic 
alliances literature (Kale and Singh, 2007; Kale et al., 2002). Information on the history 
of CSPs in each area served by an LSP was gathered by searching documentary evidence 
available online, including LSP and local government webpages and minutes, central 
government reports, and local newspaper articles. To exclude cross-sectoral activity 
specific to certain neighbourhoods or policy areas, we drew only on information 
identifying the inauguration date of an area-wide strategic CSP. 
Second, an index of administrative capacity captures the resources devoted by 
local governments (the public organizations principally responsible for leading LSPs) to 
central services (e.g., finance, internal audit) and management and support services (e.g., 
                                                            
3 Unfortunately, information on the executive boards of 14 LSPs was not publicly available, so our analysis 
including the partner diversity measure was carried out on a sample of 132 LSPs (65 with a waste recycling 
target, 67 without such a target). 
4 To establish the validity of the coding frame, the sectoral composition of a sample of the LSP boards was 
coded independently by the authors. This process resulted in an inter-rater reliability correlation of over 
0.90. Divergent codings were then examined in more detail and the coding frame was adapted following 
discussion about the appropriate assignment of organizations of complex sectoral origin, such as housing 
associations (nonprofit) and local government-owned companies (public). 
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human resources, IT). This indicator gauges the volume of administrative support 
potentially available to LSPs, and is constructed by normalizing the expenditure on 
central administration in a 0,1 range for each year in our sample, with a higher score 
indicating higher capacity. Formally, 𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 = [𝑐𝑠 − min(𝑐𝑠)] /[max(𝑐𝑠) −
min(𝑐𝑠)], where cs represents expenditure on central administration per capita.5 Prior 
research indicates that central administrative resources hold the key to organizational 
capability in the public sector (see Andrews et al., 2016). 
Third, the variable CEO tenure captures the experience of the senior manager 
principally responsible for the performance of the CSP by measuring the length of tenure 
(in years) of the chief executive of the lead local government for each LSP. According to 
the related literature, the accumulated experience of a chief executive can be considered 
a proxy for managerial capability (see, e.g. Cabral, 2017; Fabrizio, 2012). Data on tenure 
length came from the following sources: Boyne et al. (2017), Municipal Year Books, 
local governments’ webpages and local newspaper articles.   
Finally, in order to test the impact of target intensity on recycling performance 
(H4), we include in our models a measure of target heterogeneity. Now, instead of a 
dummy treatment variable (D), we investigate the treatment intensity, TI (or, in other 
words, the LAA target stretch). TI is hence a variable with different treatment intensity 
across LSPs, and is defined as the improvement required from the baseline 2007 recycling 
figure to hit the 2010 target. Formally, 
 
                                                            
5 Data on central administration costs are collected annually in accordance with the Chartered Institute 
for Public Finance and Accounting (CIPFA)’s Financial Reporting Standard 17. Due to a small number of 
missing observations, our analysis including the administrative capacity measure is carried out on a slightly 
reduced sample of LSPs.     
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𝑇𝐼 =
0                                                       𝑖𝑓 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 0
(𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 − 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒)
(𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒)
∗ 100          𝑖𝑓 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 1    
 
 
Control variables 
Following the literature on municipal waste management performance, three control 
variables are added to our models.6 First, we include the Index of Multiple Deprivation 
score for each area served by an LSP. Higher social needs, lower co-production capacity 
and recruitment and retention issues may have a negative effect on the performance of 
LSPs working in deprived communities (Romero et al., 2010). Second, we include 
population density figures to capture the relative geographic concentration of the 
households that produce the waste that is collected and disposed by LSPs. Partnerships 
operating in densely populated areas could generate economies of scope, which can be 
reinvested in process and product innovations (Grosskopf and Yaisawamg, 1990).  
Third, the potentially positive effects of investment in environmental services in 
each area served by LSPs are controlled by including local government environmental 
expenditures per capita. Unfortunately, it is not possible to access information on the 
environmental expenditures of all the public, private and non-profit partners involved in 
waste recycling. Nevertheless, since local governments have a statutory responsibility to 
manage the waste produced within the areas served by LSPs, their expenditure is a good 
proxy for a general commitment to improve recycling rates.  
Data sources for all the variables used in our analysis are reported in Table 1, 
along with descriptive statistics and variable definitions. Correlation analysis suggests 
there are no severe multicollinearity issues in our data. Although there are two cases 
                                                            
6 Other exogenous factors not included in our models may account for differences in recycling 
performance, such as population demography and public attitudes towards recycling, but the available 
data to account for those factors are time-invariant, and therefore not suitable for our analysis.   
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where correlations appear relatively high (see Table 2), the individual Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF) is well below 2 for all explanatory variables (Belsley et al. 1980). 
[Table 1 about here] 
[Table 2 about here] 
Empirical strategy 
Difference-in-Differences analysis 
To examine whether the presence of an explicit target within a contract is related to 
improvements in CSP performance, and to assess the influence of partner diversity and 
partnership capabilities, we compare the percentage of waste recycled in the communities 
served by the 68 LSPs agreeing recycling LAAs with that of the communities served by 
the 78 LSPs without recycling LAAs. We begin by estimating a generalized Difference-
in-Differences (DiD) model to approximate the impact of targets. This model estimates 
the effect of an LAA on an LSP’s waste recycling rate: 
𝑦 = 𝛼 + 𝛿 + 𝛽 𝐷 + 𝛾 𝑋 + 𝜀  (1) 
where the “1” subscript denotes the equation number. The term yit represents the log of 
the recycling rate for year t in LSP i, αi denotes LSP fixed effects, and δt represents time 
(yearly) effects. The X matrix in Equation 1 includes our time-varying explanatory 
variables, and εit is the remainder stochastic disturbance term. Although generalized DiD 
models without control variables can provide a ‘clean’ estimate of the impact of 
contractual-based governance on partnership performance, the inclusion of control 
variables can increase the precision of our estimates. Hence, to test the consistency of the 
results, we estimate our baseline models with and without explanatory variables. 
 
Initial specification 
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In the first model specification, the fixed effects control for time-invariant differences in 
waste recycling performance due to unobserved factors that differ across LSPs (e.g. 
population demography), while time effects control for common time shocks affecting all 
LSPs (e.g. changes in national government). The estimate of β is our coefficient of 
interest, which represents the approximate impact of target setting on the environmental 
value created by LSPs. This coefficient signifies the difference between the change in 
recycling performance before and after LAA implementation compared with the 
difference in recycling performance for those LSPs without a waste recycling LAA.   
The key identifying assumption in DiD settings is that in the absence of 
“treatment” the difference between the two groups would have remained stable over time 
– the parallel trends assumption (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). Hence, a deviation from the 
parallel trend as a result of the LAA implementation can be interpreted as the approximate 
impact of target-setting. To investigate the parallel trends assumption, we include in our 
model lead time effects to test for potential anticipatory effects (Autor, 2003). Thereafter, 
we undertake Mora and Reggio’s (2015) parallel-trends test to establish if there are 
systematic pre-treatment trend differences between both groups. 
 
Treatment dynamics 
To evaluate the dynamics of the potential effects of including explicit targets in formal 
contracts, along with testing our key identifying assumption, we estimate a model 
including lead and lag effects of recycling LAAs on recycling performance. Formally: 
𝑦 = 𝛽 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∗ 𝑑 + 𝜌 (𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∗ 𝑑 ) + 𝛼 + 𝛿 + 𝛾 𝑋 + 𝜀  (2) 
Leads and lags in Equation 2 are a series of dichotomous variables, where each 
lead is set to one if the LSP concludes a LAA j years in the future and zero otherwise. 
Hence, β2j measures potential lead effects, capturing non-parallel trends in recycling 
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performance between treated and non-treated LSPs before LAA implementation. If the 
common trend assumption holds, the coefficients associated with all leads should be zero.  
Lags are dichotomous variables for each year n following LAA implementation, where 
ρ2n measures the lagged effects of a LAA and tests whether the policy effects increased, 
decreased or stayed the same. Since LAAs were abolished in 2011, we can assess whether 
target removal has undesired consequences.  
 
Moderator covariates  
To analyse whether LSPs with high levels of partner diversity strengthen the impact of 
the inclusion of an explicit target within their performance contract, we estimate the 
following interactive statistical model:  
𝑦 = 𝛼 + 𝛿 + 𝛽 𝐷 + 𝜋 (𝐷 ∗ 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 ) + 𝛾 𝑋 + 𝜀  (3) 
where partner diversityi measures the executive board heterogeneity of each LSP. 7 
To establish whether LSPs with more partnership capabilities enhance the 
effectiveness of contracts with explicit targets, we estimate the following multiplicative 
interaction model: 
𝑦 = 𝛼 + 𝛿 + 𝛽 𝐷 + 𝜋 (𝐷 ∗ 𝑃𝐶 ) + 𝜌 𝑃𝐶 +𝛾 𝑋 + 𝜀  (4) 
where PCit refers to each of the three capability proxies described in the data subsection. 
To avoid potential multicollinearity issues, we fit one separate model for each moderator 
variable. The results when including all three multiplicative interactions at the same time 
remain basically unchanged (see Appendix: Table 1A).  
                                                            
7 It should be noted that the multiplicative interaction model shown in Equation (3) omits the constitutive 
term for partner diversity. This indicator is time invariant and therefore cannot be separately estimated 
by means of a fixed effects model. Nonetheless, it is controlled through the individual fixed effects. 
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Finally, to test how target intensity affects subsequent performance, we deploy a 
model accounting for different treatment intensities across our units of study. 
Specifically, we estimate the following model: 
𝑦 = 𝛼 + 𝛿 + 𝛽 (𝑇𝐼 ∗ 𝑑 ) + 𝛾 𝑋 + 𝜀  (5) 
Because target intensity was agreed through negotiations between central 
government and LSPs, treatment intensity is, to a certain extent, endogenous. This raises 
the possibility of reverse causality, especially as the government and the LSPs may have 
asymmetric information about past or expected waste recycling (see Boyne and Chen, 
2007). Since the common trend tests described above are not sufficient to discount reverse 
causality in this model specification, we also estimate Equation 5 with an instrumental 
variable approach, using fixed-effects two-stage least squares (FE-2SLS). The first-stage 
regression is given by: 
𝑇𝐼 = 𝛼 + 𝛿 + 𝜃 𝑍 + 𝛾 𝑋 + 𝜀  (6) 
where we obtain the fitted values 𝑇𝐼. The second stage of our FE-2SLS procedure 
therefore estimates Equation 5 using 𝑇𝐼 instead of TI. Our instrument (Zit) is the weighted 
average of observations on the target intensity variable over neighbouring LSPs. 
Formally, this spatial variable is given by 𝑤 𝑇𝐼 , where wij is an element of the 
spatial matrix (W) reflecting the relative connectivity between LSPs.8  
During target negotiations with central government, LSPs might be affected by 
negotiations in neighbouring LSPs. Geographical proximity often influences local policy 
decisions (Brueckner, 1998; Rincke, 2006). For that reason, target intensity in LSP i may 
                                                            
8 The spatial matrix W is a normalized contiguity N x N matrix specifying the ‘neighbourhood relation’ 
between LSPs, where an element wij has a value greater than 0 if LSPs i and j share borders, and 0 
otherwise (since LSPs are not connected with themselves, the diagonal elements of W are equal to 0).  
22 
 
be correlated with that in neighbouring LSPs’. The first-stage relationship between our 
instrument and target intensity, F-test of excluded instruments, and Kleibergen-Paap’s 
(KP’s) under-identification test indicate that spatial dependence is a relevant instrument, 
i.e. correlated with target stretch (see Appendix: Table 2A). We also have strong 
theoretical reasons for assuming that our instrument is not correlated with recycling 
performance residuals after controlling for other covariates. Spatial dependence in local 
policy decisions is often driven by isomorphic pressures to adopt practices regarded as 
legitimate, rather than by efficiency-related considerations (Alonso et al., 2016; Bivand 
and Szymansky, 2000).  
 
RESULTS 
We begin our discussion of the results by assessing the impact of introducing an LAA for 
waste recycling, before evaluating the impact of partner diversity and partnership 
capability. Robust standard errors are clustered by LSP to deal with concerns about serial 
correlation in DiD specifications (see Bertrand et al., 2004).9  
Table 3 presents point estimates and robust standard errors (SEs) for the 
regression model described in Equation 1 (Model 1), with and without the control 
variables. The results are consistent with our first hypothesis: the waste recycling 
performance of LSPs with a recycling LAA improved at a faster rate than that of LSPs 
without such an LAA. This effect is present even when controlling for the negative 
relationship between socio-economic deprivation and waste recycling. Null expenditure 
effects, such as those we find here, have been identified in prior research on recycling 
rates (e.g. Lakhan, 2016; Tsai, 2008), and have been attributed to challenges associated 
                                                            
9 Wooldridge’s (2002) test for serial correlation in panel data clearly rejects the null hypothesis of no first-
order autocorrelation in our models, with p-values equal to 0.000 for both baseline model specifications, 
i.e. equation 1 with and without control variables.  
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with predicting and controlling waste collection costs (Lakhan, 2016).10 More 
specifically, the coefficient estimates for our first model, both with and without controls, 
suggest that LSPs with an LAA increased their recycling performance by about 11 percent 
(95% CI [0.045,0.175] and [0.057,0.173], respectively). This is a non-trivial effect size 
and one that points towards relatively strong benefits of ‘governance by targets’ for the 
value created by CSPs.  
[Table 3 about here] 
The initial specification does not indicate whether the positive effects of target-
setting are sustained over time. Nor does it illustrate anticipatory effects, which may 
threaten the validity of our identification strategy. Analysis of these treatment dynamics 
can assuage endogeneity concerns, and uncover performance in the three “post-
treatment” years when LAAs were abolished (2012, 2013, and 2014).  
Figures 1a and 1b depict the pre-treatment patterns along with post-treatment 
patterns for the leads and lags models, excluding and including control variables (full 
results are reported in Appendix A: Table 3A). These figures, along with table 3A, 
confirm the absence of anticipatory effects and illustrate the treatment dynamics in this 
case. First, in the years before the introduction of LAAs, there is no evidence of 
anticipatory effects as there is no statistically significant difference between the recycling 
performance of the treated and control groups. This absence of anticipatory effects is also 
observed when estimating our preferred model specification, which includes control 
variables. In addition, Mora and Reggio’s (2015) common trend test indicates that for 
both models, with and without control variables, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of 
common pre-treatment dynamics (p-values equal to 0.98 and 0.95). 
                                                            
10 To test for the possibility that the relationship between environmental expenditures and recycling is 
nonlinear, we estimated equation 1 with squared and non-squared versions of the expenditure variable, 
but this added no further explanatory power to the model. 
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Second, the positive impact of performance targets is most likely to be observed 
once they have bedded in. Our estimates suggest that recycling performance increased 
substantially two years after the introduction of an LAA for waste recycling, with the 
positive effect peaking in 2011, where the estimated impact is about a 17.4 percent 
improvement (95% CI [0.071, 0.280]). Hence, our findings suggest that the benefits of 
target-setting are stronger in the medium rather than the short-term.  
Third, the positive effect of targets on recycling performance seems to persist even 
after LAAs were abolished in 2011. The clear downward trend following 2012, though, 
suggests that non-renewal of the performance contracts may have had negative 
consequences for waste recycling performance. A Guardian newspaper report 
highlighted that in 2015 waste recycling rate England dropped for the first time ever 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/dec/15/recycling-rates-england-drop-
first-time.  
 [Figure 1 about here] 
Turning our attention to the impact of explicit targets on recycling performance 
contingent on partner diversity, Table 3 also reports estimates of the interactive statistical 
model shown in Equation 3 (Model 2). First, the inclusion of the variables interacting the 
treatment dummy with partner diversity re-affirms our previous conclusions regarding 
the effectiveness of an LAA for waste recycling: the average marginal effects11 of having 
an LAA in the multiplicative interaction models are positive and exhibit similar point 
estimates and standard errors to those reported in Model 1.  
Focusing on the combined effect of the treatment dummy and partner diversity, 
the coefficient for the interaction term is positive, but robust standard errors do not permit 
                                                            
11 In multiplicative interaction models, the coefficient for the moderated variables show their relationship 
with the dependent variable when the moderator variable is set to zero. For this reason, it is necessary to 
compute marginal effects (see Brambor et al., 2006) 
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us to definitively conclude that this moderating effect is not statistically different from 
zero. To fully explore the possibility of a combined effect, it is more informative to 
examine the marginal effect of an LAA for waste recycling across different levels of 
partner diversity. Following Brambor et al. (2006), the most effective way to present this 
information is plotting the slope and confidence intervals of the marginal effects. Hence, 
Figure 2 illustrates the effect of being treated contingent on LSPs’ board diversity.12 The 
solid sloping line plots the marginal effect of having an LAA as the Blau index measuring 
board diversity varies, while the shaded bands represent the 95% confidence interval. The 
figure suggests that the positive effect of target-setting is strengthened when the Blau 
index is above 0.3. LSP boards with an index of lower than 0.3 are likely to be dominated 
by public sector representatives, and therefore less able to realise the benefits for goal 
achievement from bringing together a wide range of complementary capabilities than 
their more sectorally diverse counterparts. Due to the predominance of public 
organizations, they may also be less willing to consider innovative and non-hierarchical 
approaches to pursuing partnership objectives.  
Figure 2 also reports the percentage of observations falling within the region of 
statistical significance via a histogram showing the frequency distribution for partner 
diversity. The figure highlights that a high percentage of observations have values of the 
Blau index at which the marginal effect of the treatment is positive and significant. This 
evidence and the substantial magnitude of the coefficient of the interactive term (about 
0.14), lead us to interpret our results as confirming the second hypothesis, even though 
the coefficient itself is not statistically significant (see Brambor et al., 2006). 
 [Figure 2 about here] 
                                                            
12 To save space, we present only marginal effect plots for the interactive statistical models including 
control variables. The results from the specifications without controls are similar (available on request).   
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Focusing now on the effect of partnership capabilities, we report in Table 3 the 
regression results of the multiplicative interaction models including each of our capability 
measures. In line with Hypothesis 3, the positive effect of signing an LAA for waste 
recycling is higher in those CSPs with greater partnership experience (Model 3a) and 
higher administrative capacity (Model 3b): the coefficient for the interaction terms being 
positive (about 0.013 and 0.19, respectively), and robust standard errors suggest that these 
point estimates are statistically different from zero. These findings are confirmed when 
we plot the marginal effects. Figure 2 illustrates that LSPs’ experience is likely to have a 
substantive positive effect on the impact of contractual forms with explicit targets when 
the number of years since the LSP was formed is above eight, while the effect of 
administrative capacity is positive (and substantial) over the whole distribution of the 
capacity index. On the other hand, the results show that the local government chief 
executive’s experience does not influence the effectiveness of having a recycling LAA 
(Model 3c).13  
The tenure of the local government CEO may be a less important source of 
partnership capabilities than other qualities that these organizational leaders possess, such 
as a business management education or past experience working for or with private and 
non-profit partners. It is also conceivable that CEOs who have been longer in post may 
be more resistant to new collaborative styles of working than their less-experienced 
counterparts. Unfortunately, detailed information of this kind on the background and 
                                                            
13 It should be noted that the variable CEO tenure is highly right-skewed (see Figure 2), which may affect 
our estimates. To deal with this potential concern, we constructed two alternative indicators to account 
for CEO experience. First, we followed a similar approach to that used to construct the administrative 
capacity index, i.e.  we normalized the chief executive's length of tenure in a 0,1 range for each year in 
our sample, using a max-min approach. Second, we created an ordinal variable (CEO exp) using four 
quantiles, where 1=low experienced CEO (tenure<=2 years); 2=middle-low experienced CEO (tenure<=4 
years); 3=middle-high experienced CEO (tenure<=7 years); 4= high experienced CEO (tenure> 7 years). 
The results using these alternative indicators, however, remain the same (see Appendix: Table 4A). 
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attitudes of these CEOs is not currently available, but would undoubtedly enable 
researchers to cast valuable light on all of these intriguing possibilities in the future. 
Finally, Table 4 reports estimates of the fixed-effects regression model shown in 
Equation 5 (Model 4a). The results support our fourth hypothesis: LSPs with tougher 
waste recycling targets achieved stronger improvements in performance. The size of the 
point estimates for treatment (or target) intensity in both models, with and without 
controls, indicate that for every percentage point increase in target toughness, there is, on 
average, a corresponding improvement in recycling performance of about 0.4 percent 
(95% CI [0.0028, 0.0046] and [0.0027, 0.0045], respectively).  
Our results for target intensity could be biased, however, if target-setting is 
endogenous. Hence, in Table 4 we also report estimates using the discussed FE-2SLS 
approach utilising spatial dependence as an instrumental variable (Model 4b). These 
estimates are in line with the non-instrumental variable approach, though point estimates 
and standard errors are slightly larger. Nevertheless, to add further confidence in our 
approach, we tested whether the non-instrumented target intensity variable can be treated 
as exogenous using the tests described in Baum et al. (2007) and Davidson and 
MacKinnon (1993). The results of these tests suggest that we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that a non-instrumental estimator of the same equation would yield consistent 
estimates.  
 [Table 4 about here] 
In sum, our findings support the argument that the use of explicit targets within 
contractual forms has a positive effect on the performance of CSPs, especially when 
partner diversity and partnership capabilities are high. Furthermore, tougher performance 
targets can result in stronger performance improvements. Hence, our empirical evidence 
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indicates that target-setting within contractual governance arrangements may be an 
effective approach to the strategic management of CSPs. 
 
Robustness checks 
The use of generalized DiD models (or fixed effect models) is based on the assumption 
that unobserved characteristics of units or individuals are constant over time. In our case, 
however, it is conceivable that LSPs with a LAA to improve waste recycling performance 
may have been struggling to achieve acceptable waste recycling rates. UK government 
could, in such circumstances, have prioritised negotiating recycling LAAs for under-
performing partnerships. Past performance may, therefore, be a time-variant confounder 
that is not adequately controlled using fixed effects alone. To check our results´ 
robustness, we therefore estimate the models described in Equations 1, 3, 4 and 5, 
respectively, including lagged dependent variables.  
Dynamic fixed effects estimates, the Least Squares Dummy Variable Corrected 
(LSDVC) estimator derived by Kiviet (1995), and system generalized methods of 
moments (GMM) estimators (e.g. Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995) 
confirm our previous findings. So too, do estimates from a bootstrapped bias correction 
for the fixed effects estimator in dynamic panels derived by Everaert and Pozzi (2007) 
(see Appendix: Tables 5A-10A).14  While the effect sizes are somewhat smaller when 
past performance is included within the models, this is not surprising, since lagged 
dependent variables capture much of the variability in data, biasing the coefficients for 
other independent variables downwards (Angrist and Pischke, 2008).  
 
                                                            
14 Unlike Kiviet’s (1995) procedure, Everaert and Pozzi’s (2007) bootstrapping procedure avoids relying on 
a strict set of assumptions, such as homoscedasticity (De Vos et al., 2015).   
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DISCUSSION 
Consistent with the arguments that we develop in support of contractual forms with 
explicit targets for cross-sector collaboration, we find that CSPs that agreed performance 
targets with higher levels of government were more effective than those that did not. In 
addition, among partnerships that agreed recycling targets those with high levels of 
partner diversity, stronger partnership capabilities and tougher performance targets 
performed better. Further analysis affirms these insights for value creation in the context 
of CSPs: when performance targets were removed, partnership performance declined. 
These findings have implications for theory and practice. 
 
Implications for the strategic management literature 
This study advances strategic management research in the public interest by extending 
transaction cost perspectives on the contractual governance of inter-organizational 
relationships to the value created by CSPs. While relational capabilities may be essential 
for making cross-sector collaborations work (Caldwell et al., 2017), our analysis indicates 
that contractual forms of governance with explicit targets have a non-trivial positive effect 
on their performance. Based on a quantifiable measure of the social value CSPs create, 
the findings suggest performance targets may be an effective means for successfully 
combining public, private and non-profit capabilities. Although econometric analyses 
suggest targets can improve the performance of public organizations (e.g. Boyne and 
Chen, 2007; Kelman and Friedman, 2009), comparatively little systematic research has 
addressed the effectiveness of contractual forms with explicit targets as tools for 
improving the performance of CSPs. Furthermore, in adopting a DiD-style analysis we 
deploy a more rigorous methodology than has been utilised in previous research dealing 
with the issue of governance by targets.  
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We also contribute to capabilities theories by clarifying the role that partnership 
capabilities play in shaping the potential for contractual governance of CSPs to result in 
enhanced value creation. Our findings suggest that the benefits of contractual forms with 
explicit targets are especially strong for CSPs with high levels of sectoral diversity and 
for those with more partnership capability. Partner diversity is a key source of unique 
resources and complementary capabilities (Quélin et al., 2017). Our results imply that a 
more balanced representation of partners from different sectors reduces the transaction 
costs associated with achieving comprehensive action in pursuit of social goals (Lasker 
et al., 2001). Partnership experience and administrative capacity too may reduce those 
costs, suggesting accumulated capabilities enhance the potential for explicit targets to 
create value in CSPs by minimizing opportunism and encouraging goal commitment 
(Quélin et al., 2016).  
In addition to the literature on strategic management in the public interest, our 
findings can inform extant scholarship on private-private partnerships by highlighting that 
partner diversity and partnership capabilities play key roles in shaping the effectiveness 
of contractual forms of governance. Future research dealing with strategic alliances 
between private firms should therefore seek to incorporate these variables within their 
models predicting the relationship between different governance forms and performance. 
Our study also contributes to debates among management scholars about the value of 
tough targets for organizational improvement (Sitkin et al., 2011). Prior research finds 
that target intensity can have performance-enhancing effects for public organizations 
tasked with creating public value (Boyne and Chen, 2007). Our findings provide support 
for the application of stretch targets within the more complex and managerially 
challenging setting of CSPs. The increases in waste recycling rates that we identify 
illustrate that tangible progress on social goals may be associated with the introduction of 
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tough targets for CSPs tasked with their improvement. As such, the study affirms the vital 
role that strategic management of cross-sector collaboration can play in addressing grand 
societal challenges (George et al., 2016). 
 
Implications for practitioners and policy-makers 
The results of our study demonstrate to practitioners that the tools used for the contractual 
governance of CSPs matter. In particular, contractual forms with explicit targets may be 
essential for ensuring that cross-sector collaboration fulfils its promise as a vehicle for 
value creation. Politicians and policy-makers concerned with promoting and encouraging 
collaborative strategic management should therefore consider supporting target-setting 
within the contractual governance arrangements for managing CSPs. In doing so, they 
should pay close attention to the role that tough “stretch” targets can play in motivating 
partners to work more closely together, and to the rewards that can be made available to 
partnerships for meeting those targets.  
The research also provides valuable lessons for the leaders and managers of the 
partner organizations within CSPs. While partner diversity may be difficult to manage, it 
is a source of collaborative advantage and value creation when partnership goals are clear 
and transparent. Time and resources spent eliciting and supporting comparable levels of 
involvement from each sector of the economy may therefore pay dividends. Likewise, 
although the challenges of sustaining CSPs in the long-term are considerable, a history of 
successful collaboration has a performance pay-off. More specifically, for public sector 
partners, retention of a healthy stock of administrative capacity can ensure they meet the 
public accountability requirements to which they are subject when participating in CSPs. 
Government policies and initiatives could be developed to support partner investments in 
each of these partnership capabilities.  
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CONCLUSION 
Our study contributes to the growing literature on strategic management in the public 
interest by providing robust statistical evidence of the effectiveness of contractual forms 
with explicit targets for the creation of value by CSPs. To date, research investigating 
partnership performance, focused on the use of explicit targets, in a multi-actor cross-
sector setting incorporating the crucial moderating effects of partner diversity and 
partnership capabilities has been lacking. We hope that our study provides a foundation 
for further theoretical development and empirical tests in such settings. 
Although our findings are consistent with a transaction cost perspective on cross-
sector collaboration, the available data do not permit us to determine whether targets 
motivate partners to share knowledge and other resources more intensively. More 
research is therefore needed to pinpoint the processes through which contractual forms 
with explicit targets shape managerial and organizational behaviour within CSPs. 
Furthermore, performance reward payments notwithstanding, the contracts we analyse 
made no provision for the distribution of the value created by the partnership, the mutual 
rights and obligations of different partners or for any future contingencies that may affect 
the operation of the partnerships. Hence, it is conceivable that value creation would be 
stronger still where CSPs utilise contractual governance structures that are more 
comprehensive in scope and detail. 
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Table 1. Description of variables and summary statistics 
 Description Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
1. Log waste recycling Household waste re-used, recycled or composted. 
3.42 0.42 0.69 4.16 
2. D (treated*d) Dummy coded 1 for LSPs with a LAA for waste 
recycling after year 2007, and coded 0 otherwise. 0.27 0.44 0 1 
3. Partner diversity Blau index denoting the relative share of 
organizations from the public, private and non-
profit sectors represented on the executive board 
of each LSP 0.46 0.14 0 0.67 
4. LSP age Number of years since an LSP was set up.  
7.53 4.2 0 24 
5. Admin capacity Expenditure on central administration per capita, 
standardized in a 0,1 range for each year in our 
sample. 0.25 0.17 0 1 
6. CEO tenure Chief executive's length of tenure in years, 
including the present year if the CEO was 
appointed during the first half of the year (before 
July). 5.25 4.11 1 24 
7. Treatment intensity (TI*d) Variable measuring different target intensities 
across LSPs, defined as the improvement 
required from the baseline 2007 recycling figure 
to hit the 2010 target. 9.84 21.25 0 145.4 
8. Deprivation Average ward score in each local government 
area of the English Index of Multiple Deprivation 
(IMD)*. 23.87 9.46 4.89 61.34 
9. Population density Persons per km2 
2514.76 2779.62 61.12 13741.67 
10. Environmental spending per 
capita 
British Pounds per person 
78.89 35.68 14.05 361.95 
Notes: (*) The IMD combines multiple neighbourhood-level indicators, indexed across different domains (income, employment, health and disability, 
education, housing, living environment and crime), into a single deprivation score. The average ward (neighbourhood) score is the standard measure of 
relative deprivation for each local government area used by UK central government. 
Data sources: 1. UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA). 3. Sustainable Community Strategies that LSPs were required to 
produce in 2008 and executive board meeting minutes available online. 4. LSPs documentary evidence available online. 5/10. Chartered Institute for Public 
Finance and Accountancy. CIPFA Finance and General Statistics. 6. Boyne et al. (2017), Municipal Year Books, local authorities’ webpages and local news 
available online. 7. Authors’ calculations. 8. Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM), Various years, The English Indices of Deprivation. 9. Office for 
National Statistics, Various years, Census, National Report for England and Wales (ONS, London).  
 
Table 2. Correlation matrix 
 
Variables 1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Log waste recycling 1          
2. D (treated*d) 0.26 1         
3. Partner diversity -0.17 0 1        
4. LSP age 0.46 0.39 0.13 1       
5. Admin capacity -0.24 0.06 0.28 0.12 1      
6. CEO tenure -0.01 0.04 0.08 0.03 -0.06 1     
7. Treatment intensity  0.14 0.76 0.04 0.33 0.18 0.02 1    
8. Deprivation -0.49 0.11 0.24 0.11 0.46 -0.06 0.21 1   
9. Population density -0.34 0.13 0.31 0.08 0.45 0.02 0.19 0.45 1  
10. Environmental 
spending per capita 
-0.04 0.18 0.32 0.19 0.35 -0.08 0.21 0.27 0.51 1 
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Table 3. Estimated impact of explicit targets on waste recycling performance 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3a Model 3b Model 3c 
D (treated*d)a 0.1097 0.1149 0.1078 0.1092 0.0645 0.0806 0.1116 0.1123 0.1101 0.1151 
 (0.0330) (0.0295) (0.0336) (0.0305) (0.0320) (0.0301) (0.0315) (0.0290) (0.0332) (0.0295) 
D * partner diversity   0.1418 0.1434       
   (0.1801) (0.1715)       
D * LSP age     0.0163 0.0129     
     (0.0035) (0.0042)     
D * admin capacity       0.2754 0.1928   
       (0.0995) (0.0885)   
D* CEO tenure         -0.0015 -0.0012 
         (0.0032) (0.0030) 
LSP age  0.0853  0.0877 0.0960 0.0836  0.0867  0.0855 
  (0.0149)  (0.0142) (0.0136) (0.0136)  (0.0149)  (0.0149) 
Admin capacity  0.0725  0.0538  0.0654 0.0134 0.0101  0.0722 
  (0.0441)  (0.0507)  (0.0437) (0.0567) (0.0506)  (0.0441) 
CEO tenure  -0.0018  -0.0006  -0.0014  -0.0017 -0.0016 -0.0014 
  (0.0018)  (0.0018)  (0.0018)  (0.0018) (0.0023) (0.0021) 
Deprivation  -0.0215  -0.0225  -0.0213  -0.0203  -0.0215 
  (0.0043)  (0.0050)  (0.0043)  (0.0042)  (0.0043) 
Population density  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Environmental spending  -0.0008  -0.0011  -0.0007  -0.0009  -0.0008 
  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006) 
Observations 1752 1700 1620 1573 1752 1700 1710 1700 1742 1700 
R-squared (within) 0.81 0.83 0.82 0.84 0.82 0.83 0.82 0.83 0.81 0.83 
p-F test on fixed effects 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
p-Robust Hausman test 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: Unit and time effects included in all models. Robust standard errors clustered at the partnership level (in parentheses). (a)  Treatment 
Average Marginal Effects reported in multiplicative models. 
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Table 4. Estimated impact of target intensity on waste recycling performance 
 
 Model 4a (FE) Model 4b (FE-2SLS) 
Treatment intensity 0.0037 0.0036 0.0046 0.0050 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0022) (0.0025) 
LSP age  0.0822  0.0758 
  (0.0122)  (0.0170) 
Admin capacity  0.0515  0.0417 
  (0.0413)  (0.0417) 
CEO tenure  -0.002  -0.0022 
  (0.0017)  (0.0017) 
Deprivation  -0.0199  -0.0191 
  (0.0040)  (0.0039) 
Population density  -0.0001  -0.0001 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Environmental spending  -0.0006  -0.0007 
  (0.0005)  (0.0005) 
Observations 1752 1700 1752 1700 
R-squared (within) 0.82 0.84 0.82 0.84 
p-F test on fixed effects 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
p- Robust Hausman test  0.000 0.000   
p-Exogeneity test A   0.658 0.547 
p-Exogeneity test B   0.451 0.338 
Notes: Unit and time effects included in all models. Robust standard errors clustered at the partnership level (in 
parentheses). Exogeneity tests A and B refer to those tests described in Baum et al. (2007) and Davidson and 
MacKinnon (1993), respectively. 
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Note: Black dots represent point estimates while vertical bars show 95% Confidence Intervals. 
Figure 1. Estimated impact of explicit targets on waste recycling performance for years 
before, during, and after implementation 
 
Figure 2.  Marginal effects of explicit targets on waste recycling performance contingent 
on partner diversity and partnership capabilities 
 
